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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff Petitioner, 
v. 
CURTIS W. COLLINS, : Case No. 20010371-CA 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
On July 26,2002, this Court issued a unanimous decision in State v. Collins, 2002 UT 
App 253, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 {Addendum), which opinion affirmed the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant timely filed a petition for 
rehearing. Pursuant to this Court's Order dated August 22,2002, the State now responds.1 
ARGUMENT 
(1) THIS COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL RELEVANT AND 
MATERIAL FACTS 
Defendant first claims that this Court improperly considered facts which were not 
before the trial court and overlooked a fact presented to the trial court. See Defendant's 
Petition for Rehearing [Pet Reft./ at 2-3. Defendant is incorrect. 
1
 Defendant's petition does not contain a good faith certification as required by 
rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Nevertheless, the State responds pursuant 
to this Court's Order. 
Defendant asserts that paragraph 4 of the Collins opinion improperly relies on facts 
which were not before the trial court when it considered defendant's motion to suppress. Id, 
The challenged portion reads: 
Upon arriving at Logan Regional Hospital, Deputy Yeates did a "complete pat-
down search of Mr. Collins" during the admission process. During the searc h, 
Deputy Yeates found a knife sheath under clothing in Defendant's crotch area. 
Deputy Yeates looked inside the sheath and then, upon seeing a "small plastic 
baggy with a yellowish white powder," handed it to Officer Baty. 
Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 4. The paragraph is substantively almost identical to the 
statement of facts contained in defendant's memorandum filed in support of his motion to 
suppress. Defendant's statement of facts reads: 
In the Mental Health Unit [of the Logan Regional Hospital], "Chief Deputy 
Yeates did a complete pat down search of Mr. Collins." Chief Deputy Yeates 
removed the Defendant's wallet from his back pocket and a knife sheath from 
inside the front of his pants and gave them to Officer Baty Officer Baty 
also opened the knife sheath and found a small baggy with a white powdery 
substance inside. 
(R. 40-41). The only substantive difference between paragraph 4 and defendant's statement 
is the identity of the officer who opened the knife sheath. Identification of which officer first 
opened the knife sheath is not necessary, however, to resolve the Fourth Amendment issue. 
Instead, the dispositive fact is that a police officer conducted the challenged search. See 
State v.Ellingsworth, 966P.2d 1220,1222-23 (Utah App. 1998) (recognizingthatthe Fourth 
Amendment applies to law enforcement searches, but only extends to non-law enforcement 
searches when done for no other purpose than to aid the government's investigatory 
function), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999). 
2 
Here, the State never disputed that a police officer conducted the search, but 
recognized that it was unclear which officer opened the knife sheath. See Brief of Appellee 
[Br.Aplee.J at 6 ("The knife sheath was opened by Bates and/or Yeates (R. 69: 16-17, 20, 
25).")- This Court likewise recognized that while "[tjhere [was] some question as to whether 
Yeates was acting as a peace officer or as a private citizen [i.e., medical EMT] . . . [the 
Court] assume[s] Yeates was acting as a peace officer because this is how the parties argued 
the case to the trial court and on appeal." Collins, 20002 UT App 253, ^ 4 n.2. 
Consequently, Collins is correctly predicated on the salient facts: the search was police-
conducted (regardless of which officer conducted it) and, thus, subject to Fourth Amendment 
constrictions. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that paragraph 4 is inaccurate because it relies, in part, 
on the preliminary hearing testimony. See PetReh. at 2. According to defendant, the trial 
judge, who was also the preliminary hearing magistrate, only considered the facts contained 
in defendant's memorandum in support of his motion to suppress. Id. See also Brief of 
Appellant [Br.Aplt] at 8 n.2 & Reply Brief of Appellant [Reply Br.] at 5. The State 
disputed defendant's contention, not only because it was unrealistic to think that the judge 
would disregard evidence he heard in the preliminary hearing, but additionally, because the 
full record facts may be considered in affirming a lower court's denial of a motion to 
suppress. See Br.Aplee. at 3 n.3. 
In any case, this Court need not resolve the record dispute. For even if defendant were 
correct that the preliminary hearing testimony could not or was not considered by the trial 
3 
court, the outcome of defendant's appeal is the same: the search is legal because a police 
officer may statutorily and constitutionally search a mental detainee incident to his civil 
commitment. See Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 11. To obviate defendant's concerns, 
however, paragraph 4 could easily be altered to read: 
Upon arriving at Logan Regional Hospital, Deputy Yeates did a "complete pat-
down search of Mr. Collins" during the admission process. During the search, 
Deputy Yeates found a knife sheath under clothing in Defendant's crotch area. 
A police officer looked inside the sheath and saw a "small plastic baggy with 
a yellowish white powder." 
(emphasized words added and some original words deleted). Substituting the generic term 
"police officer" for a named officer renders paragraph 4 consistent with both parties' views 
of the evidence and, at the same time, does not change the substance of the Collins opinion. 
Defendant next alleges that this Court failed to consider that defendant was briefly 
frisked by officers prior to being transported by the ambulance crew to the Logan hospital. 
See PetReh. at 3. Again, the fact that a frisk occurred was not disputed. See Br.Aplee. at 
5. Nor was it overlooked by this Court: 
Prior to entering [the emergency room], [the responding officers] "checked 
[Defendant] for weapons" by doing "an outside pat-down . . . of his pockets" 
and boots, 
Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 4. The Court's statement accurately reflects the trial court's 
uncontested finding: 
The officers took the Defendant into custody and walked him across the 
parking lot to the emergency room. At this point the officers apparently 
conducted a search of the Defendant and found several items in the 
Defendant's boots, but a knife sheath in his pants was undetected. 
4 
(R. 49-50). 
In sum, defendant's claim that this Court overlooked or improperly considered facts 
is without merit. Collins' factual foundation is sound. 
(2) THIS COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED COUNSELS 
CONCESSION BELOW 
Defendant claims that this Court incorrectly interpreted his counsel's statements 
during the motion to suppress to be a concession that his civil detention was legal. See 
Pet.Reh. at 3, Again, defendant's argument is without merit. 
In moving to suppress, defendant claimed that he could not be searched absent a 
search warrant unless an exception to the Fourth Amendment applied (R. 37). In his 
accompanying memorandum, defendant admitted that he "had been delivered to the Mental 
Heath Unit under the authority of a 'Certificate for Commitment to the Local Mental Health 
Authority Emergency Procedure'" (R. 39). Neither the motion nor memorandum challenged 
the validity of the civil commitment. 
To the contrary, the fact that defendant was lawfully detained under a civil 
commitment order was the basis of defendant's argument that no traditional Fourth 
Amendment exceptions - such as search incident to arrest - applied. When the prosecutor 
attempted to analogize the mental detainee procedure to an arrest, defense counsel protested 
that he was solely under a civil commitment authorized under UTAH CODE ANN. § 62(a)-12-
232 (1997) (R. 70: 2-3). Defense counsel continued: 
5 
Yeah, that's what it is, is a civil commitment. [UTAH CODE ANN. §] 77^7-2 
[1999], an arrest by a peace officer requires that there be a warrant except for 
public offense committed or attempted in the presence the peace officer, et 
cetera. 
I think it's obvious that if the Brigham City police, or for the matter the 
county sheriff, arrested this gentleman, that it was without a warrant and there 
was no public offense committed, period. It wasn't a public offense, it was a 
civil commitment. They had the obligation to transport, I agree with that. 
(R.70: 4). Defense counsel stated: 
When [the police] took Mr. Collins from the Bear River Mental Health to the 
Brigham City emergency room initially, they looked for weapons. They did a 
search. That's part of the facts. The Brigham City police did a search. 
(R. 70: 5). The trial court asked if the police had authority to conduct the initial frisk and 
defense counsel responded: 
I think - I'm not sure they did have authority for that search, but that's not 
what I'm questioning here. I'm not questioning that particular search. I 
suppose that they have authority maybe based on the theories of the Terry stop 
and the Terry custody things. Initially they have a right to see that there's no 
weapons, to see that there's no danger. That may be the exigent circumstances 
that allows that to do it initially. And that happened here. I don't have any 
particular problem with that. 
But then, after that took place - and if there was an arrest, which I don't 
believe there was, but that was the point of the arrest, the Brigham City police. 
If there was a search incident to arrest that would have had to be it. The search 
- and then the sheriffs department gets involved and the ambulance crew 
takes him to Logan and delivers him to the mental health unit. 
Now, what I would say there is the mental health unit has an obligation 
to do the search if there's one to be done at that point. 
(R. 70: 5-6). Minutes later, defense counsel again stated: 
Mr. Collins was in the custody of the mental health unit in Logan at the time 
because that's where he's been delivered to. . . . I don't believe it was an 
arrest. I believe that clearly the statute that allows transport makes it not an 
arrest. It's a civil commitment. 
6 
(R. 70: 7). 
In sum, as this Court correctly concluded, counsel's statements constituted a 
concession that his civil detention was legal. See Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 9. But even 
if not characterized as a concession, counsel's statements below waived his right to challenge 
the legality of his detention on appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11,10 P.3d 346 
(reaffirming that an appellant may not raise legal or factual issues for the first time on 
appeal); CityofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1387-88 (Utah App. 1994(recognizing that 
an appellant may not circumvent on appeal his statements below). Consequently, the issue 
properly was not addressed in Collins. 
(3) THIS COURT PROPERLY DID NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
PLAIN ERROR ARGUMENT RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS 
REPLY BRIEF 
Defendant's final complaint is that this Court did not address the validity of his civil 
commitment under the plain error or exceptional circumstances exception to the preservation 
rule. See PetReh. at 3. The complaint is without merit. 
In his opening brief, defendant claimed he preserved a challenge to the validity of his 
civil commitment. See Br.Aplt at 6, 11, 15-16. The State responded that defendant had 
conceded that issue below. See discussion, supra at 5-7. For the first time in his reply brief, 
defendant asserted that, even if not preserved, this Court should nevertheless review the issue 
for the first time on appeal under the plain error/exceptional circumstances doctrines. 
It is well-established that an appellant may not raise a plain error claim for the first 
time in his reply brief. See Premier Van Schaack Realty v. Sieg, 2002 UT App 173,1 10 
7 
n. 1, 51 P.3d 24. See also UTAH R. APP. P. 24(c). This Court, therefore, did not consider the 
merits of defendant's unpreserved and improperly raised argument. 
Moreover, because defense counsel conceded the validity of his civil detention, any 
alleged "plain error" would necessarily also be "invited error." It is well-established that 
invited error precludes plain error review. See State v. Lit her land, 2000 UT 76, ^  31, 12 
P.3d 92; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997). Consequently, this Court, having 
concluded that defense counsel conceded the issue, see discussion, supra at 5-7, properly 
declined to consider it on appeal. 
Similarly, contrary to defendant's claim, see PetReh. at 4, this Court should not now 
consider rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which rule provides that the 
absence of an objection will not prejudice a party if the party had no opportunity to object 
to the ruling. Defendant cites rule 20 for the first time in his petition for rehearing, therefore, 
it is not properly raised. Cf. Premier Van Schaack Realty, 2002 UT App 173, f 10. 
Moreover, rule 20, like plain error, is simply an exception to the preservation rule. Here, no 
exception applies because defendant did more than fail to preserve the issue, he conceded it. 
See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31; Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. And, in any case, rule 20 is 
inapplicable because, as this Court concluded, defendant had an opportunity to object to the 
lower court's procedures, but did not do so. See Collins, 2002 UT App 253, f 10. 
In sum, Collins properly declined to address defendant's plain error argument. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny defendant's petition for rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this °<Mh day of September, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney Genera 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Response in 
Opposition to Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage prepaid, to JACK H. MOLGARD, 
attorney for defendant/petitioner, 102 South 100 West, P.O. Box 461, Brigham City, UT 
84302, this <Uh day of September, 2002. 
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Addendum 
2002 WL P2^83 I 
— P.3d — 
(Cite as: 2002 \VL 1726831 (Utah App.)) 
H 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Curtis W. COLLINS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20010371-CA. 
July 26, 2002. 
Defendant charged with possession of 
methamphetamine moved to suppress evidence 
obtained from search conducted when defendant was 
taken into protective custody. The First District 
Court, Brigham City Department, Ben H. Hadfield, 
J., denied the motion and defendant brought 
interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals, Bench, 
J., held that: (1) defendant failed to preserve for 
appellate review claim that he had no notice trial 
court would imply warrant exception in temporary, 
involuntary commitment statute; (2) warrantless 
searches of defendant being taken into protective 
custody did not violate Fourth Amendment; and (3) 
scope of warrantless search of person being taken 




[1] Criminal Law 491137(1) 
llOkl137(1) 
Issue of whether statutory procedure for temporary, 
involuntary commitment was complied with could 
not be raised on appeal of narcotics prosecution 
where defendant conceded in trial court that his 
detention was legal. U.C.A. 1953, 62A-12-232. 
[2] Criminal Law <®=> 1031(1) 
U0kl031(l) 
Defendant charged with possession of controlled 
Copr. © West 2002 No ( 
Page I 
substance failed to preserve for appellate review 
claim that he had no notice trial court would imply 
warrant exception in temporary, involuntary 
commitment statute or would rely on emergency 
circumstances exception to- justify search of 
defendant taken into protective custody; although 
court raised issue of cases involving similar searches 
prior to commitment to mental health facility and 
expressed intention to take matter under advisement 
and find authority on point, defendant failed to 
object to court's procedure. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4.; U.C.A. 1953, 62A-12-232. 
[3] Searches and Seizures <®^39 
349k39 
Warrantless searches of defendant's person incident 
to his commitment to mental health facility under 
temporary, involuntary commitment statute did not 
violate Fourth Amendment U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4; U.C.A. 1953, 62A-12-232. 
[4] Searches and Seizures <®=»39 
349k39 
Search incident to protective custody, just as search 
incident to lawful arrest, is allowed under 
Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4. 
[5] Mental Health <®=»40 
257Ak40 
Requirements of temporary, involuntary 
commitment statute were met before police officer 
took defendant into protective custody where 
defendant's doctor and other witnesses were 
concerned for their own and defendant's safety and 
defendant was acting in manner that could have 
easily led to serious injury of himself or others. 
U.C.A. 1953, 62A-12-231 to 62A-12-232. 
[6] Searches and Seizures <®=?185 
349kl85 
There is implied authorization to conduct search 
incident to taking individual into custody pursuant to 
temporary, voluntary commitment statute; without 
such implied authorization to conduct search, peace 
officer could not effectuate legislative intent of 
preserving safety of public or individual being taken 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
:uo: \\i ry^\ 
(Cite as 2002 WL 1726831 (Itah App.)) 
into custody U S C A Const Amend 4 , U C A 
1953, 62A-12-231 to 62A-12-232 
[7] Searches and Seizures <@=>39 
349k39 
Just as search incident to lawful arrest is 
constitutionally permissible, so too is search incident 
to being taken into protective custody; core inquiry 
in Fourth Amendment analysis is whether person 
has reasonable expectation of privacy in area 
searched and person being placed in civil protective 
custody can expect to be searched same as 
individual who is placed in criminal arrest custody. 
U S C A Const Amend 4. 
[8] Searches and Seizures <S=>39 
349k39 
Statutorily authorized search for persons being taken 
into protective custody is not limited in scope to 
simple weapons pat-down; purpose of civil 
protective custody search is to protect not only 
peace officer, but also mentally ill individual and 
others. U S C A. Const. Amend. 4; U C.A. 1953, 
62A-12-231to62A-12-232. 
Jack H. Molgard, Molgard & Hunsaker, Bngham 
City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, Christine 
Solus, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee. 




*1 f 1 This is an interlocutory appeal by Defendant, 
Curtis Collins, from an order denying his motion to 
suppress evidence obtained from a search conducted 
when Defendant was taken into protective custody 
during involuntary commitment into a mental health 
umt Defendant is charged with possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine, a second 
degree felony We affirm the trial court's demal of 
the motion to suppress 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 "We recite the facts in the 'light most favorable 
Page 2 
to the trial court s tindings trom the suppression 
hearing' ' State v Giron, 943 P 2d 1114, 1115 
(Utah Ct App 1997) (citation omitted) 
1| 3 Defendant went with his mother for a scheduled 
appointment with Dr William Weber at Bear River 
Mental Health in Bngham City During the 
appointment, Defendant "gradually levved up, 
demonstrating confusion [and] inability to control 
his repetitive and threatening behavior" and 
contmued to become more violent and irrational 
Fearing for their safety, Defendant's mother and 
clinic staff locked the building's doors when 
Defendant eventually wandered outside Defendant 
then began yelling and pounding on the glass doors 
Dr Weber felt that Defendant was off his 
medication and needed to be hospitalized so he 
called the Bngham City Police. The responding 
officers spoke with the doctor, caseworkers, and 
Defendant's mother, and received a "Certificate for 
Commitment to the Local Mental Health Authority 
Emergency Procedure." The Certificate was signed 
by Dr. Weber who had examined Defendant and 
concluded that he was "mentally ill and, because of 
his mental illness, [was] likely to injure himself or 
others if not immediately restrained." Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A-12-232(i)(a)(ii) (2000). [FN1] Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-12-231 to 232 (2000), 
the officers took Defendant into custody for 
transport to Logan Regional Hospital where 
Defendant could be temporarily and involuntarily 
held. 
t 4 The officers escorted Defendant to the mental 
health facility's emergency room. Pnor to entermg, 
they "checked [Defendant] for weapons" by domg 
"an outside pat-down .. of his pockets" and boots 
After medication was given to Defendant to calm 
him down, the officers turned Defendant over to an 
ambulance crew and Officer J. Baty for transport to 
Logan Regional Hospital Lynn Yeates, an 
emergency medical technician (EMT), was pan of 
the ambulance crew. [FN2] Upon arming at Logan 
Regional Hospital, Deputy Yeates did a "complete 
pat- down search of Mr. Collins" during the 
admission process. During the search, Deputy 
Yeates found a knife sheath under clothing in 
Defendant's crotch area. Deputy Yeates looked 
inside the sheath and then, upon seeing a "small 
plastic baggy with a yellowish white powder/' 
handed it to Officer Baty In addition to the baggy 
and white powder, Officer Baty also found a straw 
Copr e West 2002 No Claim to Ong U S Govt. Works 
2002 WL 1"26831 
(Cite as: 2002 VV L 1726831, *1 (Utah App.)) 
and several pieces of foil that had a burnt substance 
on it. Further testing of the knife sheath and the 
powdery substance confirmed the presence of 
methamphetamine. 
*2 % 5 Defendant was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony. 
Following his preliminary hearing, Defendant filed a 
Motion to Suppress the evidence discovered in the 
warrantless search of Defendant's person by Yeates 
and Baty. The trial court denied this motion, 
concluding that (1) there is an implied authorization 
to conduct a search incident to taking an individual 
into custody pursuant to sections 62A-12- 231 to 
-232; or, in the alternative, (2) the officers were 
engaged in a "valid community caretaking role" so 
any searches came within the "emergency 
circumstances" exception to the warrant 
requirement. This court granted Defendant's petition 
for an interlocutory appeal to review the denial of 
his Motion to Suppress evidence obtained from the 
warrantless searches. See State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 
474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
H 6 The central issue before us is whether a 
protective custody search is allowed under the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. First, Defendant argues that 
"the warrantless searches of Defendant's person and 
his belongings were in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution." 
[FN3] Second, Defendant argues that Utah Code 
Ann. § 62A- 12-232(l)(a)(i) was not complied with 
when Defendant was taken into custody and that 
sections 62A-12-231 to -232 do not create an 
implied exception to the warrant requirement. 
Finally, Defendant argues that the searches do not 
fall within the "emergency circumstances" or 
"community caretaker" exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. Defendant claims that there art no 
facts on which to base the emergency circumstance 
or community caretaker exceptions, because the 
searches were primarily motivated by intent to arrest 
and seize evidence. 
K 7 " 'In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to suppress evidence, we will not overturn 
the trial court's factual findings absent clear 
error....' The trial court's legal conclusions, 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim 
Page 3 
however, we review for correctness." State v. 
Navanick, 1999 UT App 265,H 7, 987 P.2d 1276 
(citations omitted); see also State v. Anderson, 910 
P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996). 
ANALYSIS 
%S Section 62A-12-232 provides, in relevant part: 
(l)(a) An adult may be temporarily, involuntarily 
committed to a local mental health authority upon: 
(i) written application by a responsible person who 
has reason to know, stating a belief that the 
individual is likely to cause serious injury to 
himself or others if not immediately restrained, 
and stating the personal knowledge of the 
individual's condition or circumstances which lead 
to that belief; and 
(ii) a certification by a licensed physician ... 
stating that the physician ... has examined the 
individual ..., and that he is of the opinion that the 
individual is mentally ill and, because of his 
mental illness, is likely to injure himself or others 
if not immediately restrained. 
*3 (b) Application and certification as described in 
Subsection (l)(a) authorizes any peace officer to 
take the individual into the custody of a local 
mental health authority and transport the individual 
to that authority's designated facility. 
(4) Transportation of mentally ill persons pursuant 
to Subsections (1) ... shall be conducted by die 
appropriate municipal, or city or town, law 
enforcement authority or, under the appropriate 
law enforcement's authority, by ambulance.... 
Id. (emphasis added). 
[1] % 9 On appeal, Defendant argues that section 
62A-12-232(l)(aX0 was not complied with. 
However, Defendant cannot raise this argument on 
appeal, after having conceded in the trial court that 
his detention was legal. Defendant's attorney 
expressly stated, "They [meaning the police] had the 
obligation to transport, I agree with that." The 
defense cannot now "circumvent its earlier 
concession." City of Or em v. Henrie, 868 P. 2d 
1384, 1387 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). " '[A]n appellate 
court normally will not consider issues, even 
constitutional ones, that have not been presented 
first to the trial court for its consideration and 
resolution.' " Id. (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). We therefore decline to address this issue 
for the first time on appeal. See id. 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
:uo2 \\L r>*< 
(Cite as: 2002 \\ L 1726831. *3 (Ltah \pp.)) 
[2] H 10 Additionally, Detendant argues for the first 
time on appeal that Defendant's due process rights 
were denied because the trial court's memorandum 
decision "advanced new theories of which the 
Defendant neither had notice or opportunity to 
address ' Defendant claims that he had no notice 
that the lower court would imply a warrant 
exception in section 62A-12-232 or that, in the 
alternative, the court would base its decision on the 
emergency circumstances exception. Defendant 
therefore contends that he 'was not in a position to 
object to the trial court's desire to take the motion 
under advisement and do independent research." 
Our reading of the record does not support 
Defendant's contention. At the motion hearing, the 
judge stated that "[sjurely there's been other cases 
where in the process of a [civil commitment] to a 
mental health facility either weapons or contraband 
. . was discovered " In response, Defendant's 
attorney replied, "I've looked and I didn't see 
anything in regard to that." The court then told both 
parties that it would take the matter under 
advisement to "find some authority that's on point." 
The defense did not object to the court's procedure 
at this point and failed to object in the trial court 
thereafter. We therefore decline to address this 
issue. See State v. Holgcue, 2000 UT 74,f 11, 10 
P 3d 346 ("As a general rule, claims not raised 
before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."). 
[3][4] H 11 Defendant also argues that the 
warrantless searches of his person were conducted 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant 
contends that the tnal court erred in finding an 
implied exception to the warrant requirement within 
sections 62A-12-231 to -232. We disagree, and 
conclude that a search incident to protective 
custody, just as a search incident to a lawful arrest, 
is allowed under the Constitution. See State v. 
Brown, 853 P 2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). 
*4 H 12 Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
and we accord no deference to the legal conclusions 
of the tnal court but review them for correctness. 
See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,H 17, 
977 P2d 1201. In interpreting statutes, our 
"primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant 
to achieve." Evans v. State 963 P 2d 177, 184 (Utah 
1998). "We therefore look first to the statute's plam 
language." Id. We interpret a statute to grant an 
agency M'such implied powers as are reasonably 
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necessary to etfectuate its express powers or 
duties ' Bennion v. ANR Production Co., 819 P 2d 
343, 350 (Utah 1991). 
[5] H 13 The legislature has clearly authorized "any 
peace officer to take [an] individual into 
custody" so the individual can be transported to a 
mental health authority to be involuntarily 
committed if certain requirements are met. Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-12-232(l)(b). These requirements 
include a certification by a licensed physician stating 
that "because of his mental illness, [the individual 
being committed] is likely to injure himself or others 
if not immediately restrained." Utah Code Ann. § 
62A-12- 232(1 )(a)(u). From our review of the 
record, it is apparent that these requirements were 
met. Defendant was actmg in a manner that could 
have easily led to the serious injury of himself or 
others. See id. Dr. Weber and the other witnesses, 
including Defendant's mother, were concerned for 
their own and Defendant's safety These facts 
indicate that it was proper for Dr. Weber to request 
that the police place Defendant mi protective 
custody. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-232(1). 
[6] U 14 The plain language of the statute indicates a 
concern for the safety of both the individual being 
taken into custody and those the statute refers to as 
"others." Accordingly, we agree with the trial court 
that there is an implied authorization to conduct a 
search incident to taking an individual into custody 
pursuant to sections 62A-12-231 to -232. Without 
such implied authorization to conduct a search, a 
"peace officer" could not effectuate the legislative 
intent of preserving the safety of the public or the 
individual being taken into custody. Therefore, we 
conclude that, pursuant to the statute, a peace officer 
is authorized to conduct a search under sections 
62A-12-231 to-232. 
[7] % 15 We recognize that the "Fourth Amendment 
prohibits all unreasonable searches and seizures " 
Brown, 853 P.2d at 855 (citing Kan v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). "Warrandess searches are per 
se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement." 
Id. Just as a search incident to a lawful arrest is 
constitutionally permissible, so too is a search 
incident to being taken into protective custody "The 
core inquiry in a Fourth Amendment analysis is 
'whether a person has a reasonable expectation of 
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privacy in the area searched. Id. (quoting United 
States v. Bilanzich, 111 F.2d 292, 296 (7th 
Cir.1985)). A person being placed in civil protective 
custody can expect to be searched the same as an 
individual who is placed in criminal arrest custody. 
Indeed, a protective custody search of a mentally ill 
individual may be more warranted given the greater 
likelihood that they could injure themselves or 
others with a concealed weapon. We thus conclude 
that the searches in this case did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment and are, therefore, 
constitutional. 
*5 [8] H 16 Furthermore, this statutorily authorized 
search is not limited in scope to a simple weapons 
pat-down. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In a civil 
protective custody search, the purpose is to protect 
not only the peace officer but also the mentally ill 
individual and others. Although Defendant correctly 
asserts that any implied exception to the warrant 
requirement is "limited by constitutional 
protections," there was no violation of such 
protections in this case. Accordingly, the searches 
performed in this case were proper. Such a result is 
not only consistent with the legislature's "intent in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve," Evans, 963 P.2d at 184, but is also 
consistent with other case law. See, e.g., 
Washington v. Dempsey, 88 Wash.App. 918, 947 
P.2d 265 (1997); Washington v. Lowrimore, 67 
Wash.App. 949, 841 P.2d 779 (1992). [FN4] 
U 17 We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of 
Defendant*s Motion to Suppress evidence obtained 
from the searches incident to taking Defendant into 
protective custody. 
Pa^t 
H 18 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge, and JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
FN1. We cite to the most recent version of Utah 
Code Ann § 62A-I2- 232 as there have been no 
relevant changes in this section since the searches 
at issue. 
FN2. Lynn Yeates is also a deputy for the Box 
Elder County Sheriffs Office. There is some 
question as to whether Yeates was acting as a 
peace officer or as a private citizen. However, we 
assume Yeates was acting as a peace officer 
because this is how the parties argued the case to 
the trial court and on appeal. 
FN3. Defendant refers to but engages in no 
analysis of article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, we consider Defendant's 
claims only under the Fourth Amendment. See City 
of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
FN4. The Washington cases also discuss 
emergency circumstances and community caretaker 
doctrines as bases for conducting protective civil 
custody searches. We find consideration of these 
doctrines unnecessary. Therefore, we do not 
address Defendant's arguments concerning the 
emergency circumstances and community caretaker 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
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